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Gustloff Shipwreck Expedition May 2003
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Image by JPK Krasny http://patrik.scifi.cz/dig2.html
SINKING by Irwin J. Kappes
With all cabins occupied and passengers jammed
into passageways, the GUSTLOFF got underway at 1230 on January 30th
for Kiel and Flensburg in western Germany. There were over 6,000
passengers--more than three times above capacity. Most were women
and children, elderly men and about 1,200 wounded soldiers. Last
to come aboard was the mayor of Gotenhafen and his family. Hitler
had never stepped aboard the ship, and they were given the suite
that had been reserved exclusively for him. It had never been occupied
in the ship’s seven year history.
Normally, the GUSTLOFF would have been able to
outrun any sub but she had been used as a hospital ship for years
and was poorly-maintained. With a maximum speed of only 12 knots
she was vulnerable. Although some Soviet sub activity had been reported
in the Baltic, the danger was not thought to be significant. Nevertheless,
with over 6,000 lives in the balance, the torpedo boat LÖWE
and the TF-1, a small torpedo boat, were assigned as escorts.
On the bridge of the GUSTLOFF there was an animated
discussion about the ship’s course. A course hugging the coastline
increased the danger from mines, while the deepwater northerly course,
Emergency Route 58, posed more of a danger from subs. Captain Petersen
minimized the danger from mines but pointed out that British planes
had been active in the coastal area around Danzig. They would sail
the northerly route. The idea of sailing a zigzag course was briefly
considered but was quickly discarded on two accounts: Route 58 had
been swept free of mines but was too narrow to permit zigzagging.
Also, the tactic would consume far too much time.
One thing the GUSTLOFF had in its favor was the
weather forecast. The worse the weather, the better the chances
for a safe transit. It called for snow and poor visibility. But
two hours into the voyage the weather suddenly started to clear
somewhat. Another ominous sign: The TF-1 suddenly developed a leaking
seam and radioed that it would have to return to port. Simultaneously,
radio reports on sudden sub activity in the southern Baltic were
broadcast from the naval radio station in Gotenhafen. Whether they
were picked up by the GUSTLOFF is not known, but the LÖWE was
capable of receiving transmissions only from its headquarters further
west in Swinemünde.
Just before nightfall, Captain Petersen made his
second critical error. He ordered full illumination, reasoning that
the danger from collision in the low visibility was greater than
any danger from subs. His executive officer had argued that the
standard blue lights would give sufficient warning to passing ships.
But the captain prevailed, and the GUSTLOFF was lit up like a cruise
ship gaily enroute to Majorca.
Petersen did have some justification for what in
retrospect seems like a risky tactic. For most of the war, the Nazis
had kept the Soviet fleet bottled up in Kronshtadt by a blockade
and by mining the Gulf of Finland. But after the Russo-Finnish armistice
on September 19, 1944, the Soviet Navy was finally able to break
out. However, Russian naval activity in January, 1945 was still
fitful. Still, the armistice agreement awarded the Russians important
military bases on Finnish territory, including the strategic Hangö
peninsula.
In fact, it was from Hangö that Captain Alexander
U. Marinesco of the 780-ton Soviet sub S-13 sailed on the morning
of January 11th. During nineteen days at sea he encountered only
civilian small craft in the frigid waters off Lithuania. He was
receiving radio dispatches from his home port describing the fall
of Memel (present-day Klaipeda, Lithuania) and Königsberg (now
Kaliningrad, Russia), so he reasoned that naval transports might
be evacuating troops to the west. Hugging the coastline, he saw
no activity where he expected it most.
At 2035, Marinesco raised his periscope for a final
look before surfacing for the night. Blackness all-around. After
giving the order to surface, he turned to the paperwork that even
sub captains were wedded to--bringing the boat’s log up to
date. Duty officer Lt. Yuri Yefremenkov was first to emerge from
the hatch. Visibility had improved further but there still were
no potential targets in sight. After several minutes he suddenly
noticed a slight glow on the horizon--just barely perceptible. He
thought it might be the Hela lighthouse at the tip of the narrow
peninsula enclosing the Bay of Danzig. He yelled "Captain to
the bridge" into the hull. Submariners know that this call,
as often as not, precedes a call to battle stations. Marinesco knew
his exact position and was too far north to be in sight of Hela.
It had to be a ship. He told Yefremenkov, "I’ll take
over. You go below and plot the attack." Then came the order
that brought the S-13 to life. "All men to battle stations.
Right full rudder, steer two-three-zero. Both engines ahead full."
Aboard the GUSTLOFF, Captain Petersen had just
asked his duty officer for the ship’s position. The response
was delivered with Germanic precision: "At 1945 we passed Rixhöft.
At 2430 we will be 12 miles off Stolpmünde. At approximately
0400 we will be just off Swinemünde."
Never quite believing that Russian subs might be
a serious threat, Petersen nevertheless felt reassured. By 0400
the most dangerous part of the voyage would be over, And besides,
he figured, even assuming the worst, there was life-saving equipment
for all. The twelve lifeboats held 60 people each, eighteen smaller
boats would each hold 30 people, there were 380 life rafts, and
there were life jackets for the rest. Then too, Petersen knew he
just happened to have aboard a team of specially-trained life-saving
specialists. But Petersen was in the worst form of denial. To begin
with, the temperature was 4 degrees Fahrenheit above zero and the
water temperature was around freezing. Even if all the lifeboats
and rafts were launched successfully and fully occupied--a feat
seldom achieved in the history of marine rescue--that would leave
thousands of survivors in the frigid water. In addition, no one
had seen to keeping the life boat davits free of ice. In fact, hindsight
indicates that the lifeboats should have been swung out from their
davits as the ship got underway. Petersen took this into account
but reasoned that such a procedure would have caused panic among
the passengers. The decision would end up costing hundreds of lives.
Aboard the S-13, Marinesco cannily decided to make
his attack from the coastal side, where least expected. The danger
from mines was greater there, but like Petersen, he was playing
the odds, albeit more successfully. Worse than the danger from mines
was the shallow depth. The sea was only 30 meters deep in places
and the nearby Stolpe Banks were barely nine fathoms deep in many
areas. Figuring that his target would be under the protection of
a destroyer, he considered it a risk worth taking.
Marinesco narrowed his range on the GUSTLOFF to
1,000 meters before ordering all torpedoes set to run at a depth
of three meters. He waited for the doomed ship to lumber into the
crosshairs of his periscope and then gave the order that would be
a death sentence for 5,348 hapless victims: "Fire One--for
the Motherland". Three seconds later: "Fire Two".
Then, "Fire Three--this one is for the Soviet People".
The first detonation struck the ship with the deadening
roar that survivors described as being hit by a meteor. Duty Officer
Weller’s first thought was "Mines!". He lunged for
the engine room telegraph and with both hands set it to "Stop".
Captain Petersen was nearby in his cabin, but knew instantly that
three such powerful explosions indicated torpedoes. Stunned, he
hurried to the bridge, but at first could utter only three words,
Das wär es. ("This is it"). His chief mate had already
sent out an S.O.S. Within minutes, Naval Command in Gotenhafen put
out the call to all ships in the eastern Baltic to "proceed
with all due haste to rescue site GUSTLOFF 55.07 degrees north,
17.41 degrees east."
Meanwhile, all attempts to contact the engine room
failed. All lines were dead. The ship was listing badly to port,
preventing the starboard lifeboats from being launched. Worst of
all was his sudden realization that the forward compartments were
flooded--the compartments housing his prized life-saving team! With
little supervision of the lifeboat loading, several became overloaded.
The forward falls on one boat gave way with a loud snap, tumbling
dozens of people into the freezing water 60 feet below. Other lifeboats
were being cast off with only a few passengers. Many of the passengers
appeared topside without lifejackets and, unfamiliar with the deck
plan, were pushing and shoving against the flow. The scene was one
so often repeated in disasters at sea. Some people responded with
heroism and self-sacrifice while others displayed abject poltroonery.
One deck officer was supervising the loading of a lifeboat with
the standard order, "Women and children first". But before
the boat was even half full he suddenly abandoned his responsibility
and simply took a seat in the boat.
By now, the ship’s list was making it difficult
to move around on the deck and people were jumping overboard. Escort
ship LÖWE was alongside within 15 minutes and the scene her
captain found was one of hellish confusion--made many times worse
by the frigid conditions. Survivors were taken aboard as quickly
as possible, but it was not long before the LÖWE’s crew
were as tired, stiff and frozen as the refugees. After a half-hour
in the water, many were being hauled aboard as deadweight. Desperate
calls for help came from all sides. But in some instances, the survivors
were not helpful. One woman, wearing an expensive fur coat made
slippery by the sea water, continually slipped through the hands
of the rescuers. She was last seen drifting away in the darkness.
As every nook and cranny aboard the LÖWE became
full of huddled survivors, the heavy cruiser ADMIRAL HIPPER suddenly
hove into view. The HIPPER was now the largest German warship in
the Baltic, but it too had been ordered west and was herself carrying
a load of about 1,500 refugees. She had sailed from Danzig a few
hours later than the GUSTLOFF, but was moving at flank speed of
32 knots. Wild cries of jubilation broke out among passengers still
aboard the GUSTLOFF. Peering through his binoculars, Captain Henigst
took stock of the situation. Three empty lifeboats still hung in
their davits, there were nine empty life rafts and the ship now
had a 30 degree list to port.
It was now apparent to Henigst that his ship’s
high freeboard would be an enormous obstacle to any rescue attempt.
And in their weakened condition, only the most fit survivors would
be able to climb the Jacobs ladders. In addition, the time required
for this type of rescue operation would take hours. Henigst was
torn. But before he could decide on his next move, one of his lookouts
spotted a torpedo wake 20 degrees off his starboard bow. Then a
second. The captain lost no time and radioed all rescue vessels:
"U-boat risk too great for us to risk ship, passengers and
crew. Also, our high freeboard would hinder and slow rescue attempts.
Am leaving operations in your hands. Wish you success and good luck.
Henigst."
As the HIPPER pulled away, there was puzzlement
and a feeling of betrayal among the survivors flailing about in
the icy water. Some just gave up and drifted away into oblivion.
Today, 55.07N, 17.41E is the final resting place
of the M/V WILHELM GUSTLOFF. It has been designated as a permanent
war memorial site, off-limits to salvage crews. On Polish navigation
charts it is ignominiously noted as "Obstacle No. 73."
Some attempts have been made to characterize the
sinking as an atrocity. But Captain Marinesco had no way of knowing
that his victims were mostly refugees and soldiers who would never
fight again. As a military commander he was obliged to assume that
the ship carried retreating troops. We do not know whether he would
have launched his fatal attack had he known that the GUSTLOFF carried
people offering no threat to Soviet forces. But he deserves the
benefit of the doubt. Unfortunately, in wartime one shoots first
and asks questions later.
*Actually, some historians consider the sinking
of the M/V GOYA the greatest marine disaster of all time. But no
accurate count was made of the number of refugees taken aboard and
accounts even differ on how many were rescued. All that is known
for certain is that in the last weeks of the war, the 5,000 ton
German transport hurriedly took several thousand desperate refugees
aboard from the port of Hela in what became known as "Germany’s
Dunkirk". The GOYA was sunk by two torpedoes from the Soviet
sub L-3 and rests today just north of the Gulf of Danzig.
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